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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [TU](#)
SUBJECT: TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY REACTION TO WMD
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT MOUS

REF: A. 2/21 WARDEN-RICH/SIEBENTRITT E-MAILS
[B](#). ANKARA 0343
[C](#). STATE 17741
[D](#). STATE 12882

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[1](#). (C) Summary: The Foreign Ministry is reviewing the draft WMD Enforcement Task Force MOU but told us it will be tough to sell to other agencies without modification and further justification. Post suggests we focus our efforts on the Consequence Management MOU instead and recommends ISN bureau send a small team to Ankara in late April to laborate on the rationale for a CM MOU and gather reactions from the MFA and other relevant agencies. At the same time, we should use existing mechanisms (GI, EXBS, etc) to intensify our exchanges with the Turkish government in enforcement, consequence management and other areas that further our non-proliferation agenda here. We recommend inviting Turkish observers to the major U.S. WMD management exercise TOPOFF in October 2007. While we enjoy good cooperation on bilateral enforcement issues with Turkey, Turkish officials do not seem far enough along in their understanding of the potential impact of WMD events to appreciate the utility of the MOUs we are proposing. End summary.

MFA Cool on Enforcement MOU

[1](#)2. (C) We followed up with MFA Arms Control Deputy Director General Ahmet Muhtar Gun on the draft MOU on the creation of a bilateral WMD Terrorism Enforcement Task Force (ref b) presented to the MFA February 13 on the margins of the Ankara GI meeting, adding additional supporting points provided in ref a. Gun said he had submitted the draft to relevant departments within the MFA for comment, but was reluctant to submit the draft for interagency review because it contained several "difficult points" to which other agencies will likely object. Gun's deputy Serhan Yigit subsequently explained that Turkish agencies will likely object to the enforcement task force MOU's reference to direct office-to-office and expert-to-expert coordination, pointing out that Turkish agencies operate more hierarchically than US counterparts preferring to conduct coordination at a senior level on an agency-to-agency basis with MFA approval.

[1](#)3. (C) Gun stated that injecting a new MOU into the process at this point would undermine his efforts on other high-priority activities, including to deepen Turkish participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, finalize the bilateral Non-Proliferation (AKA EXBS) Agreement, and implement the bilateral Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE) treaty once ratified by the U.S. Congress. He added that he was unable to explain to senior MFA officials the value such an MOU would add to existing bilateral instruments and mechanisms that facilitate cooperation on law enforcement and exchange of technical

expertise related to WMD. He asked whether we have such an agreement with any other country and sought further justification for how such an agreement would materially enhance our cooperative efforts.

WMD Consequence Management MOU

¶4. (C) Based on our review of the draft MOU contained ref c proposing a bilateral WMD consequence management agreement, we believe such an MOU might be more favorably received by the GOT than the enforcement MOU. However, we will need to fully explain the benefits it could provide and emphasize the distinction between the purpose and scope of this MOU and that of the enforcement MOU.

¶5. (C) We suggest adding the phrase "consequence management" to the first paragraph of the text to help clarify the purpose of the MOU. Since the MOU will affect multiple agencies, we suggest that its scope be broadened beyond the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the opening sentence read "between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey."

¶6. (C) Post recommends that a team from the Department visit Ankara in late April/early May time frame to present the Consequence Management MOU, discuss the advantages it offers for enhanced bilateral cooperation, and hear Turkish government suggestions.

¶7. (C) Post also recommends that we consider inviting Turkish observers to the next major U.S. WMD exercise for top officials (TOPOFF), scheduled for October 2007 in Portland OR, Guam, and Phoenix. By doing so, we would be able to

demonstrate to key officials here the complex response coordination required for WMD events. We understand that consequence management is planned to be a major element of at least one of the 2007 TOPOFF sites.

¶8. (C) Comment. We enjoy good cooperation on bilateral enforcement issues with Turkey. One recent example is the successful visit of U.S. nuclear smuggling experts, who conducted a seminar with police officials in Ankara and were granted access to examine smuggled LEU seized by Turkish authorities. Turkish government officials do not seem to be far enough along in their understanding of the potential impact of WMD events, however, to recognize the utility of the MOUs we are proposing. Much more spade work will be required to reach agreement on the MOUs. End Comment.

¶9. (U) Embassy POC for this issue is Political Military Officer Christopher Rich. He can be reached at (90) 312-455-5555 ext 2520.

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